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While the British continue to obsess about how to install a customs frontier against the European Union,
other vital aspects of Brexit go largely unheeded. The danger grows that no significant progress will be made
at the next critical meeting of the European Council on 28-29 June.
The Brexit process has fallen into a vicious circle: the difficult issues of Ireland and customs cannot be
resolved unless there is clarity about the nature of the UK's final relationship with the EU. But failure to
progress the debate on those two issues impairs the capacity of the European Council to get to grips with
the long term. Indeed, the heads of government have not yet had a proper discussion about the framework
for the EU's future relations with the UK. They still await from London a proposition that is detailed,
coherent, comprehensive and substantive. One hopes the White Paper to be published in June will be this.
True, Theresa May has outlined her wish to achieve a "deep and special partnership" with the European
Union after the UK ceases to be a member state. In her Mansion House speech on 2 March, she spoke of
seeking "a relationship that goes beyond the transactional to one where we support each other's interests.
So I want the broadest and deepest possible partnership – covering more sectors and cooperating more fully
than any Free Trade Agreement anywhere in the world today". The prime minister therefore believes that she
has already "put forward a plan to negotiate all these outcomes and leave the European Union".1 But that is
not the Brussels view, from where the British prime minister seems much entangled in her red lines on trade
and too reluctant to address questions of governance. 
Under the terms of Article 50(2) TEU, the Withdrawal Agreement must take account of the framework for
the future relationship between Britain and the UK. The framework will be inscribed in a formal Political
Declaration, the drafting of which cannot be put off much longer. The European Council intends to finalise
the document at its meeting on 18-19 October so that it can accompany and be referred to in the
Withdrawal Agreement (although not annexed to it). The Political Declaration will be taken into account by
the UK Parliament when it votes on the Withdrawal Agreement as well as by the European Parliament and
by the Council in concluding the Agreement.2
The Political Declaration will have legal effect. It is meant to bind the 27 leaders directly, and will form the
basis of the mandate eventually to be given by the Council to the Commission to open negotiations with
the UK on the final relationship. The document needs to be sufficiently lengthy and detailed to marshal the
27 into a consistent position at the point when tensions between them on trade issues are bound to arise.
The current instability and eccentricity of several EU governments add to the urgency of the task in front of
Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, in articulating in the Political Declaration a robust
common approach to Europe's British problem.
2Although Theresa May is not expected to have to sign the Political Declaration – which will emerge under
the Article 50 rubric as a paper of the EU 27 – she will have to give it her assent. The UK will be bound
indirectly by the terms of the Declaration even though Mrs May might very well not be the prime minister
who has eventually to deliver the final post-Brexit deal for Britain. So the Political Declaration needs to
commit, as far as is possible, not only this UK government and parliament but also their successors to the
pursuit of the defined course of action. 
British collusion in the drafting of the Political Declaration is therefore essential. The best way to influence
its shape and content would be for the UK government to write down, for its own edification and that of its
partners, its concept of the framework for the future relationship and the location of its final landing zone.
Although officials have started to prepare such a written contribution, they are doing so without much
ministerial direction. The Tory cabinet remains in a state of dumbstruck illiteracy. Moreover, despite
manoeuvres to amend the EU Withdrawal Bill which is now wending its way through the Westminster
parliament, MPs seem no more capable than the government of defining a coherent prospectus for Britain's
future as a European country.
Throughout the Article 50 process, any substantive agreement reached between the two parties has been
based on texts tabled by Brussels. Unless London now hurries to put pen to paper, the Political Declaration
identifying Britain's future place in the scheme of things will also be crafted on its behalf by those from
whom the UK has decided to separate. That may not end well. Drafting the Political Declaration is a
sensitive and essential exercise. It would be a disaster if the EU's document did not command broad-based
support at Westminster. Here, then, are some suggestions for inclusion in the Political Declaration.
Good neighbours
A good starting point for the Declaration would be the admission that although the UK has decided to leave
the European Union, the act of leaving does not resolve the old dilemma of Britain's problematical relations
with its neighbours in mainland Europe. Indeed, Brexit throws up many new challenges, not least with
regard to Ireland. 
How their relationship moves forward is a question of strategic importance for both the UK and the EU 27.
It would be pitiable to squander entirely the legacy of 45 years of British membership of the Union. Brexit
will not obliterate the memory of the shared experience of integration, pooled sovereignty, common
institutions and citizenship. In spite of the political rupture and the breaking away from the constitutional
order of the EU, Britain's close economic and cultural ties with the EU cannot be denied. The relationship
may be taking a new form, but that form must surely be designed to encourage interaction between the
citizens of the UK and the EU, to boost prosperity, and to enable shared security challenges to be addressed
in a spirit of solidarity.  
The Political Declaration will recognise that both parties aim to develop a special relationship establishing
an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, faithful to the values of the Union (Article 2 TEU) and
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation (Article 8(1) TEU). It should stress that
both parties will continue to have mutual interests. It is certainly in the British national interest that the EU
succeeds in meeting its own objectives. It would be a calamity if Brexit were to trigger the further
disintegration of the Union. Likewise, a weaker, poorer and isolated Britain, sulking 40 kilometres off Calais,
would not be an attractive neighbour for the EU. On the other hand, if Brexit heralds a new and positive
start in the relationship, the EU may well find in Britain a reliable neighbour and trustworthy partner in
protecting European interests on the world stage.
Association agreement
To that end, the future framework will take the form of an association agreement involving reciprocal 
rights and obligations and establishing the possibility of undertaking jointly a wide range of activities
(Article 8(2) TEU and Article 217 TFEU). The European Council has already stated its intention to establish
a close partnership with the UK across a broad spectrum, including trade and economic cooperation, the
fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.3 In its most
recent guidelines (23 March), the heads of government also said that they are ready to evolve their position
should the UK soften its red lines. Such evolution will best be made manifest in a written British
contribution to the Political Declaration.
The UK, for its part, needs the association agreement to encompass an economic partnership and a security
partnership plus horizontal ties regarding governance, data protection and British buy-ins to selected 
EU programmes.
Both parties, therefore, are already committed in principle to developing in the future a new balance of rights
and obligations to replace the one that pertained to membership. A comprehensive association agreement is
the neat way to do this. And there is useful precedent in the EU's recent association agreements to show how
it can be done.
Economic partnership
The economic risk of Brexit should not be underestimated. Britain leaving the single market and the customs
union will leave both it and the EU significantly worse off in material terms. It is vital that the future
framework serves to repair the collateral damage of Brexit. 
The Political Declaration should expressly recognise the essential economic interdependence of the UK and
the EU 27. Sub-optimal political decisions taken for ideological reasons must not be allowed to ruin the
operation of the trading and customs relationship. Manufacturing industry is rightly demanding continuity
of the existing supply chains that are underpinned by EU internal market law. Europe's future prosperity
depends to no mean extent on the competitiveness and integration of its services industry, including
banking. Even after absorbing the impact of Brexit, the City of London is very likely to remain Europe's
largest pool of liquid finance and primary source of related professional services. The Political Declaration
could say so. 
The British government is seeking a rules-based trade and investment partnership with the EU 27 that is
balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging, and that ensures a level playing field with the EU in terms of
competition, state aid, public procurement and intellectual property rights. At the heart of the new
economic partnership will be a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). The UK and the EU will
undertake not to impose tariffs on goods traded across the Channel or to erect non-tariff barriers. 
As things stand
As things stand, and unless there is a radical switch in government policy, the UK will no longer be a member
of the EU's internal market. So it will be necessary to supplement the DCFTA with a system of mutual
recognition agreements, sector by sector, which permit access to each other's markets. The Commission will
verify alignment under these agreements with the acquis communautaire. The UK aims to minimise
misalignment with the EU's product standards and compliance methods. It is willing to conclude Agreements
on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs) in all aligned sectors. Where UK
and EU law is not harmonised, regulatory equivalence may be achieved by voluntary agreement. 
As things stand, the UK will no longer be a member of the EU's customs union. Therefore, in order to avoid
massive economic disruption caused by the imposition of heavy customs controls at the UK-EU borders,
the UK will undertake to retain its adherence to the EU's customs code. Whatever emerges from the conflict
in the Conservative cabinet on the matter of customs arrangements, further trade facilitation measures will
have to be developed on a pragmatic basis as rapidly as possible, exploiting new technologies. The UK 
must undertake to strengthen its efforts to stop fraud and counterfeiting. Minimising physical customs
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barriers to the passage of goods through Ireland and the Channel ports is a shared objective requiring
common solutions. 
While the EU will be accommodating on goods, it will be less so on services. Nevertheless, the UK will
have to pitch for differentiated access to and the right of establishment within the EU internal market based
on current levels of openness and reciprocity. The UK will support the EU's efforts to liberalise its services
market, notably in the digital economy. 
The association agreement should facilitate, on a fully reciprocal basis and respecting fundamental rights,
the visa-free movement of people between the UK and the EU. Terms and conditions about social security,
employment rights and family law need to be agreed. The UK is committed under the terms of 
the Withdrawal Agreement to respect the rights of EU citizens resident in Britain. In the context of the
association agreement, the UK will continue to welcome to Britain students, workers and tourists from 
the EU. EU citizens lawfully resident in the UK will continue to enjoy the right to vote and stand in
municipal elections. The UK expects the EU to respond in kind in its treatment of British citizens resident
across the EU. 
In a change from its original stance, and in a concession to a House of Lords amendment to the EU
Withdrawal Bill, the government should maintain the norms established for citizens' rights in the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights. The UK is committed to remaining a signatory of the European Convention on
Human Rights: it must also promise to support the accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
As things stand, the UK will not be subject to the EU's common commercial policy. Instead, the UK aims
to develop its own international trade links. Good luck with that. The Political Declaration might advise the
UK that as far as its new trading relationship with the EU is concerned, the Union's existing relations with
other third countries, including those in the European Economic Area (EEA), must not be put in jeopardy.
In the overall context of the association agreement, and contrary to what its ministers have been telling the
fishermen, the UK wishes to negotiate reciprocal access to fisheries waters and resources with a view to the
sustainable management of fish stocks, tariff-free exports and the well-being of fishing communities.
Similarly, the UK will largely replicate the Common Agricultural Policy, although HM Treasury wants to
reduce the cost of Pillar I direct payments to farmers for food production.
The partnership treaty will include a chapter on transport to ensure open, equal and competitive access to
all modes of transportation. The UK will remain a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency.
The UK is keen to continue to make its world-class contribution to the science research and development
networks and programmes of the EU, including engagement with the European Research Council. It is
committing its universities to continued participation in Erasmus+.
The UK will adhere to the goals of the Paris treaty on climate change. It also intends to retain a leading role
in the promotion of sustainable development and in tackling cross-border pollution. It will aim for the
inclusion of ambitious provisions in the association agreement in the field of environmental policy. 
The UK is putting in place a new regulatory regime that will replicate Euratom in order to ensure the supply,
safety and security of its nuclear industry. The energy chapter of the association agreement must cater for
the British component of European inter-connectedness in terms of energy supply, security, sustainability
and competitiveness. 
The UK continues to recognise the need for the Union to safeguard its financial stability. In the context of
an overall association agreement, the UK will stand ready to contribute financially to costs incurred on an
on-going basis as a result of Britain's selective participation in EU programmes, missions and common
activities jointly agreed.
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The UK is willing to cooperate with the EU on tax collection and on measures to combat tax evasion. It
recognises its responsibilities in ensuring that its overseas territories and crown dependencies comply with
European norms of transparency.
The UK is resolved to reach an accord with Spain that will ensure the full application of the agreement in
respect of Gibraltar.
Regulation
Britain's regulatory authorities at the level of its national or devolved governments will be responsible for
monitoring the implementation of the association agreement across all relevant economic sectors. New
watchdogs are having to be created, for example in the field of the environment, with powers to ensure
conformity compliance with agreed EU norms, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The
Withdrawal Agreement prescribes the creation of a new independent body to protect the rights of EU
citizens resident in the UK. 
The prime minister has accepted the EU's goal of non-regression from the standards in place at the time of
Brexit. The UK does not mean to instrumentalise lower regulation as a competitive tool against its erstwhile
partners: indeed, the UK has a vested interest in maintaining the norms set in hard-fought EU legislation,
such as REACH. So Britain must be able to guarantee that its new regulatory framework will be independent
of the political direction of ministers and open in its dealings with private and public entities: the word of
a quango will not do. British regulators will be open for inspection by the European Commission, OLAF and
the Court of Auditors.
Under the terms of the overall agreement, the UK anticipates becoming an associate member of several EU
regulatory or programme delivery authorities, such as the European Medicines Agency, the European Food
Safety Agency and the European Environmental Agency. 
Security partnership
While a lack of clarity persists about the future relationship in the economic field because of the uncertainty
over Ireland and customs, the Political Declaration can be more fulsome about the future security element
of the association agreement. Britain is not about to change its geopolitical stance or strategic alliances. UK
membership of G7, NATO and the UN Security Council will be unaffected by Brexit. Britain expects to
continue to collaborate closely with EU institutions and EU member states in all matters of international
diplomacy. The association agreement must introduce innovatory EU machinery for an unprecedented level
of dialogue, consultation, coordination, information exchange and cooperation with a third country across
the spectrum of foreign, security and defence policy. 
The prime minister has laid out the government's intention to secure an ambitious security and defence
treaty with the EU 27 that enables robust political and military cooperation. The UK and France are in any
event committed to deepening their bilateral defence collaboration. As part of Britain's wider contribution
to European and transatlantic security, the UK is willing to offer a military and intelligence contribution 
on a selective basis to EU common security and defence policy missions. The UK as a non-member 
state can even envisage cooperation with the new European efforts to install a system of permanent
structured cooperation in defence (PESCO) – efforts which it opposed when a member state. In the interests
of joint capability development, the UK is open to associate with the work of the European Defence 
Agency – as long as it is accepted that it will "require access to both sensitive information and 
commercial opportunities".4
The UK recognises the importance of securing a comprehensive agreement with the EU over the sharing of
data and the pooling of intelligence in order to combat terrorism and international organised crime. Britain
values greatly its participation in Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the
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6European Criminal Record Information System (ECRIS). The UK wants to continue to operate the European
Arrest Warrant. 
The association agreement will cover rules for information exchange between police, customs and judicial
authorities, support for joint operations between police and security authorities, and for judicial cooperation
in criminal matters. The British government undertakes to secure the highest standards of data protection in
conformity with the evolving EU acquis. Classified information will be protected under the terms of a
bespoke security information agreement. 
The UK is a European leader in satellite technology and intends to remain a competitor for EU space
contracts. It will seek to conclude a bilateral agreement with the Galileo project, including the encrypted
Public Regulated Service. It will remain a member of the European Space Agency.
Britain is one of the world's leading contributors to overseas development funding and humanitarian
assistance. Close liaison between London and Brussels will contribute to optimum results in this critical area.
Governance
Governance of the association agreement will have to reflect the scope, depth and ambition of the post-Brexit
relationship. The EU institutions and UK government will be jointly responsible for the good implementation
of the new partnership. The system established needs to be effective, durable and democratic. It must ensure
legal certainty.
The Political Declaration is the place where the UK can stake its claim to there being joint governance of
the future partnership – a matter on which it has been reticent for too long. British thinking about
governance has evolved farthest in the matter of internal security. Here the government finds a "range of
existing legal precedents for strategic agreements that provide for EU-third country cooperation on a
particular area of the acquis. Such models all have the same basic proposed structure – an agreement with
overarching horizontal provisions enabling cooperation on the basis of existing EU measures in a specific
field, with relevant measures listed in annexes. Sustaining cooperation on the basis of existing EU measures
represents the most efficient and effective means of achieving our shared objectives".5 The Political
Declaration could usefully cut and paste those words and give them wider application across all policy
areas covered by the envisaged association agreement. 
As the two sides prepare to open negotiations on governance, they will have to cater for joint institutions
of a political, technical, parliamentary and juridical type. The institutional apparatus must underpin and
facilitate a dynamic relationship between the UK and the EU that is capable of evolving as needs,
circumstances and political objectives change.
In the context of the overall association agreement, British cooperation with the EU will be steered by
regular meetings at summit and ministerial level, and managed by sectoral technical committees. The
ministerial association council will be authorised to adapt the annexes to the agreement. There will also be
a consultative parliamentary committee between the Westminster and European Parliaments as well as a
civic platform, composed on the EU side by the Economic and Social Committee. All these bodies will be
composed jointly of British and EU representatives, and decision-making will be by consensus. 
Judicial cooperation
Brexit means that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will cease to have direct jurisdiction
within the UK. Nevertheless, the UK government will continue to respect the autonomy of the EU legal
order and British courts will be informed by jurisprudence of the CJEU on matters of law relevant to the
application of the future agreement and to the new partnership as it evolves. The UK will acknowledge the
right of the CJEU to be the sole arbiter of EU law.
The application of the association agreement will require regular judicial interpretation as well as efficient
dispute resolution and enforcement measures in case of non-compliance. For these purposes, the UK should
make the bold innovative proposal to establish a joint EU-UK court. Although such an idea was resisted by
the CJEU thirty years ago at the time of the setting up of the EEA, things have moved on. The prerogatives
of the European Court are more entrenched than they were; the corpus of EU law and jurisprudence is
wider; the process of integration is deeper; the size of the Union has doubled; and the secession of a large
state after many years of membership posits the likelihood of a large volume of complex legacy litigation. 
In fact, Brexit presents a unique set of circumstances demanding fresh thinking, including by the Court of
Justice. British and EU judges sitting alongside each other (as they have done during the many years of
membership) is the best way to secure tight judicial control over the implementation of the association
agreement. Where it proves impossible to arbitrate a dispute caused by irreconcilable differences, the
relevant parts of the association agreement would be disapplied. 
As things stand, ideological hostility to the European Court of Justice has so far prevented the UK from
signing off on all the Commission's proposals for a Joint Committee to manage the application of the
Withdrawal Agreement.6 The prime minister should drop these inhibitions in good time before the June
meeting of the European Council. 
The Joint Committee is the key to the sound management of Brexit. It works not only in the interests of the
Commission and the British government but also for those stakeholders who will experience obstacles and
misunderstandings in the implementation of the secession treaty and the conduct of the transition period.
The Joint Committee will supervise and facilitate the application of the Withdrawal Agreement. It will work
to prevent problems and settle disputes; it will be empowered to modify the Agreement based on
experience and to take on new functions. If the Joint Committee is a success, it will have paved the way for
the effective joint governance of the final, long-term partnership. The Joint Committee itself could act as the
embryonic general secretariat of the incoming association council. 
The Political Declaration should record that the UK is fully committed to maintaining and enhancing the
special governance arrangements it has agreed under the terms of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement with
Ireland in respect of the future of Northern Ireland. Likewise, the UK will continue to participate in the EU's
PEACE programme. 
Although the UK is leaving the institutions of the EU, it is not a disinterested bystander in debates or
decisions about the 'future of Europe'. Given the dynamic nature of the new partnership, the UK should
request that its representatives have observer status in any Convention established to revise the EU treaties
(Article 48(3) TEU). 
Signature and ratification
Mindful of the provisions of Article 218 TFEU that will govern the EU's negotiation and ratification of the
association agreement, and of the need to conceive the new relationship in a coherent and comprehensive
manner, it is in everyone's interest that there should be one portmanteau treaty (copying broadly the
template of the Ukraine Association Agreement of 2014). The two parties should aim to sign the single treaty
before the end of the transition period in December 2020. 
The association agreement will have the status of a mixed agreement under EU law, needing to be ratified
by numerous parliamentary chambers across the 27 member states and the three EEA countries. Provision
should be made for its partial application before ratification is completed. The security chapter, in particular,
should be implemented as soon as possible. 
The UK must propose, as a matter of urgency, that a clause is included in the Withdrawal Agreement that
would allow for a time-limited extension of the Brexit transition period in order to secure the careful
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preparation and sound implementation of the new association arrangements. As long as the Political Declaration
is sufficiently clear and purposeful, the European Council will be minded to instruct the Commission to include
in the Withdrawal Agreement provision for a second, implementing phase of the transition period. 
On 15 May the government announced that it will soon, and at long last, publish a White Paper on Britain's
future relationship with Europe. If this makes a positive and well-argued contribution to the drafting of the
Political Declaration, we can expect good results from the European Council in June and a conclusion to the
Article 50 negotiations in October. 
Without a satisfactory Political Declaration, however, the ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement will be
fraught at best and improbable at worst. Unless the European Council and the British government can define
together a clear framework for the United Kingdom's future relationship with the European Union, the
transition period will end in limbo. If the leaders cannot quickly resolve the Brexit problem long-term, it will
not only be Britain put in peril but the rest of Europe too. As Mark Rutte, the Anglophile and eurosceptic Dutch
prime minister, reminds us, "de klok tikt". 
Andrew Duff is President of the Spinelli Group and a Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre. He was
a member of the European Parliament 1999-2014. He tweets @AndrewDuffEU.
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